Explicability? Legibility? Predictability? Transparency? Privacy?
  Security? The Emerging Landscape of Interpretable Agent Behavior by Chakraborti, Tathagata et al.
Explicability? Legibility? Predictability? Transparency? Privacy? Security?
The Emerging Landscape of Interpretable Agent Behavior
Tathagata Chakraborti1 · Anagha Kulkarni1 · Sarath Sreedharan1
David E. Smith · Subbarao Kambhampati1
1Arizona State University, Tempe 85281 USA
{tchakra2, akulka16, ssreedh3}@asu.edu, david.smith@psresearch.xyz, rao@asu.edu
Abstract
There has been significant interest of late in gen-
erating behavior of agents that is interpretable to
the human (observer) in the loop. However, the
work in this area has typically lacked coherence on
the topic, with proposed solutions for “explicable”,
“legible”, “predictable” and “transparent” planning
with overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, se-
mantics all aimed at some notion of understanding
what intentions the observer will ascribe to an agent
by observing its behavior. This is also true for the
recent works on “security” and “privacy” of plans
which are also trying to answer the same question,
but from the opposite point of view – i.e. when the
agent is trying to hide instead of reveal its inten-
tions. This paper attempts to provide a workable
taxonomy of relevant concepts in this exciting and
emerging field of inquiry.
Introduction
There has been significant interest in the robotics and plan-
ning community of late in developing algorithms that can
generate behavior of agents that is interpretable to the human
(observer) in the loop. This notion of interpretability can be
in terms of goals, plans or even rewards that the observer is
able to ascribe to the agent based on observations of the lat-
ter. While interpretability remains a significant challenge1 in
developing human-aware AI agents, such as assistive agents,
the work in this area has typically lacked coherence on the
topic from the community as a whole, even if not in the re-
search agenda of different research groups [Chakraborti et al.,
2017a; Dragan, 2017; MacNally et al., 2018], per se. Indeed,
a quick scan of the existing literature reveals algorithms for
“explicable”, “legible”, “predictable” and “transparent” plan-
ning with overlapping, and sometimes conflicting, semantics.
The same can be said of a parallel thread of work on the “de-
ception”, “privacy” and “security” of plans. This paper thus
attempts to provide a workable taxonomy of relevant concepts
that can hopefully provide some clarity and guidance to future
researchers looking to work on the topic.
1As emphasized in the Roadmap for U.S. Robotics [Christensen
et al., 2009] – “humans must be able to read and recognize agent
activities in order to interpret the agent’s understanding”.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows: We will first
introduce a general framework for describing problems in
the space of “plan interpretability” and outline how existing
works have addressed different aspects of this problem in co-
operative settings. We will then turn the tables and explore
their complementary manifestations in adversarial settings.
Finally, we will end with a discussion on gaps in the proposed
framework that are yet to be explored in existing literature.
Model differences with the Observer
The key challenge in generating interpretable behavior is the
ability to account for the model of the observer. This can be
summarized as follows –
• An agent’s actions may be uninterpretable when it does
not conform to the expectations or predictions engen-
dered by the observer model. Thus, the agent, to plan for
interpretable behavior, must not only consider its own
model but also the observer model and the differences
thereof. [Chakraborti et al., 2017a; Dragan, 2017]
This “model” can include the beliefs or state information of
the agent, its goals and intentions, its capabilities or even its
reward function. It can also include the observation model as
well as the computational capability of the observer. A misun-
derstanding or mismatch on any of those accounts will mean
that the plan or policy, as expected by the observer (given
their cognitive capabilities), will not be the same as that com-
puted by the agent, and will thus be difficult to interpret from
the observer’s point of view. We will outline in the rest of this
writeup how existing work on the topic addresses one or more
of these contributing factors, especially the goals and plans2
ascribed to the agent by an observer.
Table 1 formalizes these considerations in the modeling of
the agent A and the observer Θ in terms of –
• Planning Problem: Π = 〈Domain Theory =
M,Current State = I,Goal State = G〉
2It is useful to note at this point that in this particular paper, we
talk of behavior and plan in the same breath. In general, behavior
can be seen as a particular instantiation of a plan or policy (which,
in its general form, can have loops, contingencies, abstractions, etc.)
or a policy. However, most of the works surveyed here have used
the term plan to primarily refer to behavior. We will also stick to
that convention – i.e. all the discussion here is confined to behaviors
observed or ascribed to the agent by the observer in the loop.
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Concept Setting / Agent Perspective Formulation / Existing Literature Comments
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Find: p˜i (pi in offline setting) Find expected plan (satisfies observer model).
Explicability Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ,GΘ〉, χΘ Subject to: ∃pi∈{p˜i}δ(IA, pi, χA) |= GA
Target Solve ΠA with completion in ΠΘ and ∃pi∈{p˜i},〈o〉|=p˜iδ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ Mainly concerns the plan prefix. Note that the
∃ can be switched to ∀ to model a more pes-
simistic observer model that requires all possi-
ble completions be explicable.
Related Work:
[Zhang et al., 2017] ΠΘ, χΘ unknown; GA = GΘ; Ω : a× s 7→ a ΠΘ, χΘ learned from human feedback in
terms of a labeling scheme.
[Kulkarni et al., 2018a] ΠΘ, χΘ unknown; GA = GΘ; Ω : a× s 7→ a ΠΘ, χΘ learned from human feedback in
terms of plan distance ∆(pi1, pi2).
[Chakraborti et al., 2018a] ΠA 6= ΠΘ , χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ a Has the ability (via explanations) to deal with
cases where 6 ∃pi : δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ .
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Explicability + Find most disambiguated (easy to predict) plan.
Predictability Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ,GΘ〉, χΘ min ||{pi | pi ∈ {p˜i}, 〈o〉 |= p˜i, δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ}|| Mainly concerns the plan suffix.
Target Solves ΠA with fewest completions in ΠΘ [Dragan et al., 2013] ΠΘ implicit, χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ a Motion planning in continuous space.
Related Work:
[Fisac et al., 2018] ΠΘ implicit, χΘ = SF , Ω : a× s 7→ o Motion/semi-task planning in discrete space.
[Kulkarni et al., 2019] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = C, Ω : a× s 7→ o This work looks for m-similar solutions in the
offline case (for “plan legibility” or predictabil-
ity) with similarity d such that ||S|| ≥ m
and ∀pi1,pi2∈S∆(pi1, pi2) ≤ d, where
S = {pi | δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ}
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Find: p˜i (pi in offline setting) Find plans that disambiguate possible goals.
Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ, {GΘ}〉 ≡ {ΠΘi }, χΘ Subject to: ∃pi∈{p˜i}δ(IA, pi, χA) |= GA
Legibility or
Transparency Target Solve Π
A and least number of ΠΘi s and min ||{g | g ∈ {GΘ} ∧∃pi∈{p˜i},〈o〉|=p˜i δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= g}|| Property of the goal.GA may not be in {GΘ}
as long as there is a mapping between them.
Related Work:
[Dragan et al., 2013] ΠΘ implicit, χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ a
[MacNally et al., 2018] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ a
[Kulkarni et al., 2019] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = C, Ω : a× s 7→ o This work specifically looks for j-legible
solutions in the offline sense such that
||{g | δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= g}|| ≤ j
Table 1: Summary of Concepts (cooperative setting).
• Plan: pi is a solution to the planning problem Π emitting
an observation sequence 〈o〉 |= pi. p˜i is a partial plan
whose completion set is denoted by {p˜i}.
• Computational Model: χ ∈ {S = Sound, SF =
Satisficing, O = Optimal, C = Complete}
• Completion Model: δ(s, pi, χ) 7→ sˆ captures whether a
state s′ is reachable from the state s following a plan pi
subject to the computation model (e.g. δ(I, pi,O) 7→ G
implies pi is an optimal solution to Π);
• Observation Model: Ω : a × s 7→ o associates a token
emitted for a particular action and next state pair.
Interpretability? Plans versus Goals
An agent model (and the corresponding observer model) thus
accounts for their beliefs, goals, capabilities and even compu-
tation power. In such a formulation, the notion of completion
is intrinsically related to the interpretability question – the
completion of a plan in that model is equivalent to whether
they are interpretable given the assumptions on the model and
computation power of the the observer. The exact nature of
the interpretation task may vary. Most of the distinctions sur-
rounding the interpretability3 of agent behavior deals with the
3Explicability, legibility and predictability of plans is a spectrum,
i.e. one plan can have more “X”-ability than another. In the rest of
disambiguation of goals versus plans [Dragan et al., 2013]
from the point of view of the observer.
Explicability We begin with “plan explicability” as intro-
duced in [Chakraborti et al., 2018a; Zhang et al., 2016;
Zhang et al., 2017; Kulkarni et al., 2018a].
Explicability measures how close a plan is to the
expectations of the observer, given a known goal.
Thus the objective of explicability is to be in the set
of solutions to the observer’s understanding of a planning
problem. In Table 1, the explicable plan is one that has a
completion in both the agent and the observer model. The
first constraint requires that the solution solves the agent’s
planning problem while the latter requires that there exists
a plan satisfying the emitted observations that enables a
completion in the observer model – e.g. the plan looks
optimal to the observer as in [Chakraborti et al., 2018a].
When the observer model is not known [Zhang et al., 2017;
Kulkarni et al., 2018a], as is most often the case, the comple-
tion in the observer model is difficult to guarantee. As such,
explicability is a spectrum, where closer to completed plans
in the observer model can be deemed to be more explicable.
the discussion, unless otherwise mentioned, we will refer to the end
of that spectrum, whenever such a plan exists, (e.g. most explicable
plan) when we mention an explicable, legible or predictable plan.
(a) Plan legibility / transparency. (b) Plan explicability. (c) Plan predictability.
Figure 1: A simple illustration of the differences between plan explicability, legibility and predictability. In this Gridworld, the
agent can travel across cells, but cannot go backwards. Figure 1a illustrates a legible plan (green) in the presence of 3 possible
goals of the agent, marked with ?s. The red plan is not legible since all three goals are likely in its initial stages. In the parlance
of transparent planning, the first action in the green plan can constitute a transparent plan (having conveyed the goal). Figure 1b
illustrates an explicable plan (green) which goes straight to the goal G as we would expect. The red plan may be more favorable
to the agent due to its internal constraints (the arm sticking out might hit the wall), but is inexplicable (i.e. sub-optimal) in the
observer’s model. Finally, Figure 1c illustrates a predictable plan (green) since there is only one possible plan after it performs
the first action. In the parlance of t-predictability, this is a 1-predictable plan. The red plans fail to disambiguate among two
possible completions of the plan. Note that all the plans shown in Figure 1c are explicable (optimal in the observer’s model) but
only one of them is predictable – i.e. explicable plans may not be predictable. Similarly, in Figure 1b, the red plan is predictable
after the first action (even though not optimal, since there is only one likely completion) but not explicable – i.e. predictable
plans may not be explicable. Without a prefix in Figure 1b, the green plan is the only predictable plan.
Predictability. Plan predictability, on the other hand, looks
for non-ambiguous completions of a plan prefix [Dragan et
al., 2013; Fisac et al., 2018; Kulkarni et al., 2019].
Plan predictability reduces ambiguity over possible
plans, given a goal.
Table 1 highlights this distinction with the additional min-
imization term over the cardinality of the possible plan set
(that satisfies the emitted observations) with completions in
the observer model. This makes it clear that predictability is,
again, a spectrum and –
An explicable plan can be unpredictable.
An example would be when there are multiple explicable
plans, i.e. many completions in the observer model, so that
there is still work to be done in making sure that the observer
can anticipate which plan it is that the agent is going to exe-
cute. If this can be achieved, then that specific plan would be
both explicable and predictable. Similarly –
A predictable plan (in the online setting) can be in-
explicable in the offline setting.
This is possible when, given a prefix (during online plan
execution), the observer can tell exactly what plan the agent
is executing but the entire plan is still not one that s/he might
expect it to (i.e. it does not follow the completion model of
the observer). For example, in [Fisac et al., 2018] the actions
in the plan prefix of length t can be arbitrary and inexplica-
ble as long as the postfix is predictable. This is also true for
transparent [MacNally et al., 2018] plans as well. This phe-
nomenon is readily seen in [Chakraborti et al., 2018c] where
the agent produces suboptimal plans that are easier to pre-
dict4. Figure 1 provides another example. More on this later
in the discussion on online versus offline interactions.
Legibility. So far we have discussed explicability and pre-
dictability of plans under the condition of known goals only.
Plan legibility, on the other hand, is defined as follows –
Plan legibility reduces ambiguity over possible
goals that are being achieved.
The observer model now includes a set of possible goals
or equivalently a set of possible models parameterized by the
goal, as shown in Table 1. Now, in addition to solving the
planning problem of the agent (first constraint as before), a
legible solution requires that the set of observer models (or
goals) where a plan satisfied by the emitted observations has
completions (satisfies) is minimized.
The notion of legibility of goals has remained consis-
tent across existing literature [Dragan and Srinivasa, 2013;
Dragan et al., 2013; Kulkarni et al., 2019]. and is equivalent
to the notion of transparency of plans [MacNally et al., 2018].
To the best of our knowledge, plan explicability / predictabil-
4Authors in [Fisac et al., 2018] use a fixed length of the plan
prefix to generate predictable plan suffixes. In general, a planner can
be allowed to determine this organically as done in [Chakraborti et
al., 2018c; MacNally et al., 2018].
ity and legibility has not been considered together (i.e. with
ambiguity over goals and plans simultaneously).
Interestingly, as Table 1 highlights, even though both pre-
dictability and explicability assume known goals, the goal
known to the observer may not be the actual true goal of
the agent and yet plans may be predictable or explicable.
For example, the agent could really be doing something else
but also achieve the expected goal with the desired behavior
in the process. The ability to communicate enables authors
in [Chakraborti et al., 2018a] to handle expectations under
conditions of misunderstood goals as well. However, the no-
tion of explicability remains identical as one of generating
expected behavior with a shared understanding of the goal.
Similarly, for legibility to occur, there needs to be only
some mapping between the agents goal and the possible goal
set which may not contain the real goal of the agent.
Online versus offline interactions.
The actual setup of the interaction – i.e. online or offline –
makes a big difference to the explicability versus predictabil-
ity discussion. This is because explicability and predictability
of a plan are non-monotonic, a plan prefix deemed inexplica-
ble can become explicable with the execution of more actions
and vice versa, either due to the observer being an imperfect
planner due to computational limitations or due to implicit
updates to the mental model based on the observations. The
online case of explicability can then be seen in terms of the
plan prefix – i.e. if its completion belongs to one of the ex-
plicable (completions in the observer model) or not. On the
other hand, the offline case does not exist for plan predictabil-
ity, which is a property of the plan suffix. However, in the
online case, before the execution starts (i.e. with no prefix) a
predictable plan has to be one of the explicable plans. With
a prefix, that may no longer be the case, as discussed above
(this is considering the definition explicability in the existing
work on the entire plan).
Note that, similar to the concept of predictability, legibility
of plans is more useful in the online setting since it may be
easy to deduce the real goal from the final state after comple-
tion of the plan. Though, even in such cases, when the goals
(which are not usually fully specified) are not mutually exclu-
sive, legible plans can help. Like explicability and predictabil-
ity, legibility also shares the non-monotonicity property.
Motion versus Task Planning
One of the biggest points of difference in many of these
works is in the nature of the target domain i.e. motion
planning [Dragan and Srinivasa, 2013; Dragan et al., 2013;
Dragan et al., 2015] versus task planning [Zhang et al.,
2017; Kulkarni et al., 2018a; Zakershahrak and Zhang, 2018;
MacNally et al., 2018]. From the algorithmic perspective,
this is simply differentiated in usual terms – e.g. continu-
ous versus discrete state variables. However, the notion of
plan interpretability engenders additional challenges. This
is because a reasonable mental model for motion planning5
5While this is true for path planning in general, complex trajec-
tory plans of manipulators with high degrees of freedom might still
require modeling of observer expectations.
can be assumed to be one that prefers shorter plans and
thus need not be modeled explicitly (and thus does not
need to be acquired or learned). For task planning in gen-
eral, this is less straightforward. In fact, work on explicable
task planning [Zhang et al., 2017; Kulkarni et al., 2018a;
Zakershahrak and Zhang, 2018] has aimed to learn this im-
plicit model using feedback from humans on the agent’s be-
havior. A particularly instance of this is when these model are
assumed to be identical [MacNally et al., 2018; Kulkarni et
al., 2019] (this is the case in motion planning, by default).
Given how humans can have vastly different expectations
in the case of task planning, it is unclear how useful mental
models learned from crowd feedback (as done in [Zhang et
al., 2017; Kulkarni et al., 2018a; Zakershahrak and Zhang,
2018]) can be in the case of individual interactions.
Computational Capability
The discussion is, of course, contingent on the computational
capability of the observer, as modeled in the completion func-
tion in Table 1. There has been surprisingly little work to
address this. Authors in [Fisac et al., 2018] approximated
the human model with Boltzmann noisy rationality. Motion
planning, again, can permit assumption of “top-K” ratio-
nality while the computational model of the human is less
clear in the task planning scenarios, i.e. domains with combi-
natorial properties (one can conceive of, for example, mod-
els of depth-bounded humans that constrains the space of
plans in the mental model). While almost all of the related
work [Chakraborti et al., 2018a; MacNally et al., 2018] has
assumed perfectly rational (super-)humans, models learned
[Zhang et al., 2017; Kulkarni et al., 2018a] from feedback
from human-subjects are likely to implicitly model computa-
tional limitations of the human mental model.
Discussion
Learning the Observation Model. The original work on ex-
plicability in task planning [Zhang et al., 2016; Zhang et al.,
2017] and subsequent works that build on it [Zakershahrak
and Zhang, 2018; Gong and Zhang, 2018] attempt to learn
the observer model when it is unknown. This is the only at-
tempt to do so in the existing literature. They postulate that
the explicability6 can be measured in terms of whether the
human observer is able to associate higher level semantics to
actions in the plan. While this approach has its merits, it also
arguably conflates explicability with predictability – e.g. just
because someone is able to assign task labels to individual
actions in a plan does not necessarily mean they would have
expected that plan.
Observability. The concepts of explicability, predictability
and legibility are intrinsically related to what is observable.
In most of the existing work, the plan has been assumed to be
completely observable. When this is not the case, the agent
can try to ensure that unexpected actions are not observable
6Authors in [Zhang et al., 2017] use “explicability” and “pre-
dictability” as measures towards achieving the same objective of
producing plans closer to human expectation. This is somewhat con-
fusing in the current context, though the notion of predictability used
there for the disambiguation of the plan suffix remains consistent.
and thus still be explicable. Interestingly most of the work
in cooperative settings have worked with full observability
while highlighting model differences. Later we will see that
in the adversarial setting existing work mostly focuses on
the observation model while assuming the rest of the agent’s
model is aligned with that of the observer.
Longitudinal effects. All of the work on the topic of inter-
pretable behavior has, unfortunately, revolved around single,
and one-off, interactions and little attention has been given to
impact of evolving expectations in longer term interactions.
There is some reason to suspect that the need for explicable
behavior will diminish as humans become accustomed to the
“quirks” of the agent. After all, to paraphrase George Bernard
Shaw, “the world conforms to the unreasonable man”! This
is, however, not a concern for legible and predictable behav-
ior since, even with complete model alignment, the topic of
coordination remains relevant.
Explanatory actions. In recent work [Sreedharan et al.,
2018b], authors have explored the notion of “explanatory ac-
tions” as actions that can have epistemic effects. These are
actions that can affect the observer model. Plans that are made
explicable with the use of explanatory actions are, of course,
never predictable – i.e. one cannot predict that an explanatory
action will occur during a behavior, but its presence can make
the whole behavior explicable. Thus, in this view, the set of
possible explicable plans, not all of them may be predictable.
But, as we discussed before, all the predictable plans at the
start of plan execution have to be explicable.
Human-agent Collaboration. Note that most of the discus-
sion till now has featured a human as a passive observer.
However, in most scenarios, the human is likely to be a col-
laborator or, at the least, their behavior is going to be con-
tingent on that of the agent. While explicability helps this
cause, predictable behavior can arbitrarily (and negatively)
effect the human when considered in isolation. Indeed, human
factors studies of plan predictability versus legibility [Dragan
et al., 2015] are consistent with this concern, demonstrating
that legibility is more desirable in a collaborative setting. Re-
cent work [Zakershahrak and Zhang, 2018] has started to take
these considerations into account.
On preference versus expectations. There is considerable
prior art on incorporating human preferences in robotic be-
havior, or plans in general. Indeed, the distinction between
preferences and expectations is rather subtle. The former can
be seen as constraints imposed on the plan generation process
if the agent wants to contribute to the human’s utility – “What
would Jesus want me to do?” – while the latter looks at how
the agent can adapt its behavior in a manner that the human
would expect it to (as required by the human mental model)
– “What would Jesus expect me to do?”. As we mentioned
before, in the case of motion planning, there is often no such
distinction. Even in the case of task planning – for example, in
“human-aware” planning where an agent decides not to vac-
uum while the elderly are asleep [Ko¨ckemann et al., 2014] –
sometimes it may be hard to identify where exactly the con-
straints lie, with preferences (“I don’t want vacuuming while
I am asleep”) or expectations (“I don’t expect the agent to be
designed to vacuum at odd hours”). Ultimately this distinc-
tion might not make a difference algorithmically. The agent
would need some process of performing multi-model argu-
mentation (with its own model and the observer model) dur-
ing its planning process [Chakraborti et al., 2018a].
The lines do become even more blurred in experiments,
unless carefully constructed, where human subjects are asked
to label data with their expectation (i.e. how to ensure that
they are not providing their preference instead?). Unfor-
tunately, the experimental design in [Zhang et al., 2017;
Kulkarni et al., 2018a] is noticeably susceptible to this.
Turning the Tables
So far we have talked about works that aim to reveal the in-
tentions of the agent to an observer. In a cruel twist of “hu-
man awareness”, the agent can use the human mental model
and/or the observation model to hide its intentions as well, in
an adversarial sense. In the following, we compare and con-
trast recent work in the planning community in this direction.
Many of the discussions, of course, carry over from our trea-
tise of plan explicability, predictability and legibility.
Goals versus Plans Similar to the previous discussion on
predictability/explicability versus legibility, an agent can con-
sider obfuscation of its goals and/or its plans. The goal ob-
fuscation problem is the inverse of the legibility problem,
while plan obfuscation is the inverse of the predictability
problem discussed previously. Also similar to the previous
discussion, it is easy to see that obfuscation of one (goal
or plan) may not necessarily obfuscate the other. Unsurpris-
ingly, they can be viewed under a unified framework, as ex-
plored recently in [Kulkarni et al., 2019]. Most of the existing
work in this area has revolved around goal obfuscation (un-
der the various names of privacy, deception and security) as
outlined in Table 2. Interestingly, these ideas has evolved out
of two parallel threads of research – one [Keren et al., 2015;
Keren et al., 2016; Masters and Sardina, 2017b; MacNally
et al., 2018] from the seminal work on goal recognition de-
sign [Keren et al., 2014] and the other [Kulkarni et al., 2019;
Kulkarni et al., 2018b] from the earlier work on plan ex-
plicability [Zhang et al., 2017; Chakraborti et al., 2018a;
Kulkarni et al., 2018a]. The connections between these di-
verse topics have hopefully become apparent at this point.
Motion versus Task Planning The distinction between mo-
tion and task planning again makes an appearance in the tech-
niques used to approach these problems if not in the formula-
tion of the concepts themselves. Particularly, authors in [Mas-
ters and Sardina, 2017b] arrive at a computationally efficient
proxy to the likelihood of possible goals given a state and tra-
jectory that is not necessarily available [Masters and Sardina,
2017a] to the task planning setting. A similar computation
used in [Kulkarni et al., 2018b] turns out to be incomplete.
Online versus Offline Intuitively, the obfuscation problem
is much more appealing in the online case since some of
the motivation in obfuscating plans (such as in evading a
pursuit or escaping surveillance) is lost after the plan is
done. This is particularly the case for plan obfuscation in
Concept Setting / Agent Perspective Formulation / Existing Literature Comments
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Find: p˜i (pi in offline setting) This is the inverse of the legibility problem.
Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ, {GΘ}〉 ≡ {ΠΘi }, χΘ Subject to: ∃pi∈{p˜i}δ(IA, pi, χA) |= GA
Target Solve ΠA and as many ΠΘi and max ||{g | g ∈ {GΘ} ∧∃pi∈{p˜i},〈o〉|=p˜i δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= g}|| A special case of simulation [Masters and Sar-
dina, 2017b] is δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) 6|= GA . De-
ception may or may not involve simulation.
Related Work:
[Keren et al., 2015] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ s This is a special case of k-ambiguity [Kulkarni
et al., 2019] where k = 2. Also, the solution is
not secure [Kulkarni et al., 2018b] – i.e. the real
goal may not become the decoy if the algorithm
is rerun with the decoy goal.
Goal-Obfuscation
or Dissimulation
or Privacy
[Keren et al., 2016] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ o Same as above (generalizes observation model).
[Masters and Sardina, 2017b] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = O, Ω : a× s 7→ a Last Deceptive Point (LDP) defined here (in
the context of motion planning) has parallels to
the notion of equidistant states in [Kulkarni et
al., 2018b]. The latter deals with a general task
planning setting. However, the latter deploys a
heuristic which makes the planner incomplete.
[Kulkarni et al., 2019] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = C, Ω : a× s 7→ o This work specifically looks for k-ambiguous
solutions in the offline sense such that
||{g | δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= g}|| ≥ k
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Find: p˜i (pi in offline setting) This is the inverse of the predictability problem.
Plan-Obfuscation Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ,GΘ〉, χΘ Subject to: ∃pi∈{p˜i}δ(IA, pi, χA) |= GA
Target Solve ΠA with most completions in ΠG and max ||{pi | pi ∈ {p˜i}, 〈o〉 |= p˜i, δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ}||
Related Work: [Kulkarni et al., 2019] ΠA = ΠΘ , χΘ = C, Ω : a× s 7→ o This work specifically looks for l-diverse
solutions in the offline sense such that
||{pi | δ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= GΘ}|| ≥ l
Agent ΠA = 〈MA, IA,GA〉, χA,Ω Privacy + if 〈o〉 |= pˆi (pi in offline setting), then
Security Observer ΠΘ = 〈MΘ, IΘ, {GΘ}〉 ≡ {ΠΘi }, χΘ ∀g ∈ {GΘ} : ∃pi∈{p˜i},〈o〉|=p˜iδ(IΘ, pi, χΘ) |= g A privacy preserving planning algorithm is se-
cure if it emits the same observation regardless
of which goal it is run with.
Target Find same solution for ΠA and as many ΠΘi [Kulkarni et al., 2018b] Π
A = ΠΘ , χA = ¬C, χΘ = C, Ω : a× s 7→ o [Kulkarni et al., 2019] can also allow this with
a slight modification – by generating an obser-
vation sequence that the agent wants to adhere
to from the decoy goals.
Table 2: Summary of Concepts (adversarial setting).
case of full observability, if not entirely true for goal ob-
fuscation (c.f. discussion on predictability and legibility in
offline settings). However, there is a rich set of problems
to explore even in an offline setting [Kulkarni et al., 2019;
Kulkarni et al., 2018b] once the observation model becomes
noisy or incomplete. An offline analysis also allows for the
determination of prefixes, if not entire plans, that can preserve
privacy [Keren et al., 2016]. Most often, partial solutions (or
fully obfuscating prefixes) is all that is achievable.
The Observer and the Observation Model
One of the most important variables in this thread of work is
the observation model. The notion of obfuscation and privacy
immediately follows from settings with partial observability
[Keren et al., 2015; Kulkarni et al., 2019; Kulkarni et al.,
2018b]. However, as seen in [Masters and Sardina, 2017b;
Keren et al., 2014], these concepts are still relevant to fully
observable settings, especially in the online case.
The observer model also plays a critical role in this re-
gard. Particularly, some of the surveyed works [Masters and
Sardina, 2017b; Keren et al., 2016] have modeled a ratio-
nal (more powerful) observer where P (G | 〈o〉) follows the
distribution computed by a plan recognizer (i.e. χΘ = O‘),
while others [Kulkarni et al., 2019; Kulkarni et al., 2018b]
has considered an observer with a complete planner, i.e.
P (G | 〈o〉) = 1 if a plan exists that satisfies the observation,
0 otherwise (i.e. χΘ = C). Interestingly, in contrast to expli-
cability or legibility and predictability, in the cases of goal or
plan obfuscation, none of the surveyed works have scratched
the surface of model differences between the agent and the
observer beyond the particulars of the observation and com-
putation model.
The Many Flavors of Security, Privacy,
Obfuscation, (Dis-)Simulation and Deception
The most interesting aspects of obfuscating behavior is the
different notions of privacy, security and deception. We high-
light the salient differences in Figure 2.
Obfuscation and Privacy These are synonymous in the ex-
isting literature [Keren et al., 2016; Kulkarni et al., 2019] in
attempting to make multiple goals likely or possible given
a set of observations. This is an inversion of the legibility
problem – as highlighted in Table 2, the minimizing term has
flipped. Authors in [Keren et al., 2016] look at pair-wise like-
lihood of goals in maintaining privacy, while [Kulkarni et al.,
2019] provide a more general formulation for “k-ambiguous”
(a) Simulation (b) Dissimulation
(c) Deception: Simulation versus Dissimulation. (d) Obfuscation: Private versus Secure Plans.
Figure 2: A simple illustration of different goal obfuscation behaviors. Figure 2c shows different forms of deceptive behavior
[Masters and Sardina, 2017b] in red – in simulation or “hiding the truth” (Figure 2a) the agent could be going to either of the
three possible goals while in dissimulation or “showing the false” (Figure 2b) the likelihood of a decoy goal is strictly higher
than that of the real goal. The green plan in (Figure 2a) is a truthful plan. Figure 2c illustrates the difference between privacy
and security of goal obfuscating plans. Here the observer cannot observe the actions of the agent in the first row of the grid
due to occlusions. The red and green plans are both 2-ambiguous [Kulkarni et al., 2019] and privacy preserving [Keren et al.,
2016] – the former allows for {G1, G2, G3} while the latter allows for {G2, G3} as possible goal sets for the agent assumed to
be rational. However a secure algorithm cannot flip from the red to the green plan when rerun with G2. This is allowed under
privacy preserving [Keren et al., 2016] and deceptive plans [Masters and Sardina, 2017b] but not in secure plans [Kulkarni et
al., 2018b] – i.e. the red plan is the only secure 2-ambiguous solution.
solutions. This has implications on the security of the obfus-
cating algorithm, as we discuss below.
Security and Privacy The notion of security in plans
[Kulkarni et al., 2018b] builds on the concept of “indepen-
dence of inputs” [Sˇtolba, 2017; Lindell, 2005] which requires
(in this specific context) that the planning algorithm return
the same output or plan regardless of which obfuscated goal
it is run with as the real goal so that an adversary cannot de-
termine the real goal by rerunning the algorithm. Thus –
A secure plan is always private.
This imposes an additional constraint to the privacy prob-
lem – as highlighted in Table 2, all possible goals must now
lend to the same observation tokens.
Obfuscation and Deception Finally, in goal (or plan) ob-
fuscation, the primary goal is to not reveal the true inten-
tions, but not necessarily actively mislead. This distinction
between simulation – “hiding the truth” – versus dissimula-
tion – “showing the false” – was made in [Masters and Sar-
dina, 2017b]. In the case of the latter, not only are multiple
goals likely given a plan prefix but a decoy goal is also more
likely than the real one. Deception, in general, can include
both. It is clear from the discussion that –
A deceptive plan is always obfuscating, but may or
may not be dissimulating.
A more detailed discussion of this distinction can be found
in [Masters and Sardina, 2017b].
Discussion
In the following discussion, we make connections to a par-
allel thread of work – “model reconciliation” – and outline
possible directions for future work.
Communication and Model Reconciliation
Most of the discussion in this paper has revolved around com-
munication of intentions (goals or plans) implicitly using be-
havioral cues. In general, predictable or legible behavior can
be seen as a special case of implicit signaling behavior [Gong
and Zhang, 2018] when communication is undesired. Fore-
shadowing certain actions (for example, through the medium
of mixed reality [Chakraborti et al., 2018c]) can considerably
help the cause of predictability / legibility and coordination
in human-agent interaction. The work on predictable [Fisac
et al., 2018] or transparent [MacNally et al., 2018] plans
could have similarly deployed speech, stigmergic or, in gen-
eral, communication actions in the plan prefix. As mentioned
before, recent work [Sreedharan et al., 2018b] provides a uni-
fied formulation in terms of explanatory actions.
During communication, the agent must be able to address
the root cause of inexplicability, i.e. it must be able to ex-
plicate parts of the model that differ from the human until
they agree that its plan was, in fact, the best plan under the
circumstances. This process of explanation, referred to as a
process of model reconciliation, has been of significant in-
terest [Chakraborti et al., 2017b; Sreedharan et al., 2018a;
Sreedharan et al., 2018c; Chakraborti et al., 2019] to the com-
munity recently.
Particularly when the explicable plan is infeasible, such
communication remains the only option for the agent to
achieve common ground with the human by, for example,
expressing incapability [Raman et al., 2013; Raman and
Kress-Gazit, 2013; Briggs and Scheutz, 2015; Kwon et al.,
2018], communicating misunderstandings about its capabili-
ties [Chakraborti et al., 2017b; Chakraborti et al., 2018a] or
even lying [Chakraborti and Kambhampati, 2018] and aug-
menting new goals [Chen and Zhang, 2018]. The latter works
are certainly more relevant from the perspective of the second
part of the paper which explores obfuscation of intentions in-
stead of revealing them. In fact, plan explicability and plan
explanations form a delicate balancing act in “human-aware
planning”, as explored recently in [Chakraborti et al., 2018a].
A concise survey of the model reconciliation process can be
read in [Chakraborti et al., 2018b].
Further Generalizations
In Tables 1 and 2 we provided a general framework for de-
scribing the different aspects of the plan interpretability prob-
lem. The table also highlights gaps in the existing literature
that can lead to exciting avenues of research in future. The
model considered in Tables 1 and 2, even though quite gen-
eral in being able to classify the breadth of existing work on
the topic, does not quite capture the full scope of the plan in-
terpretability. Below, we motivate a couple of generalizations
to the framework presented in Tables 1 and 2. This was done
intentionally so as not overly generalize the overview which
already captures all of the surveyed literature.
Observation Model with Epistemic Effects
The observation model used in Tables 1 and 2 is quite gen-
eral in being able to capture both partial as well as noisy sen-
sor models. This model has been used extensively in the past
[Geffner and Bonet, 2013] as well as in many of the works
covered in this survey; and provides a particularly elegant
sensor model while formulating the planning problem for a
single agent. However, when considering an observer in the
loop, one should be cognizant of the effects of observations
on the observer model – i.e. epistemic effects of actions. In
recent work [Sreedharan et al., 2018b] this has been explored
in the context of implicit model updates on the part of the ob-
server by means of “explanatory actions”. One can conceive
a more richer observation model that captures such epistemic
effects of the actions of an agent on the observer model.
Preference Measure on Plan or Goal Set
The notion of legibility and obfuscation [Kulkarni et al.,
2019; Kulkarni et al., 2018b; Masters and Sardina, 2017b;
Keren et al., 2016] has largely considered the computation of
a set of plans or goals as the desired consequence of a behav-
ior, with additional preferences on the cardinality of that set
in certain cases (e.g. predictability). Interestingly, in the solu-
tion for plan-legibility or predictability, authors in [Kulkarni
et al., 2019] look at “l-diverse” and “m-similar” solutions that
can equally apply to the goal obfuscation and legibility cases
as well. In general, the minimization or maximization term
over the plan or goal sets in Tables 1 and 2 can be replaced
by a function over the preferences of the observer towards the
agent’s achievement (execution) of any particular goal (plan)
in the possible goal (plan) set, with cardinality being a special
case of that function. More on this below.
An Active / Semi-Passive Observer
All the work surveyed here consider a passive observer. The
full scope of the interpretability problem is likely to include a
more capable observer. This can be a semi-passive observer –
i.e. one that can change the observation model only (in a sense
reversal of the “sensor cloaking” problem explored in [Keren
et al., 2016]), for example, to improved observability by go-
ing to higher ground – to a fully active observer with their
own goals and actions, with the ability to even assist or im-
pede the agent from achieving its goals. This is likely to effect
the relative importance of agent behaviors (e.g. is predictabil-
ity more important than legibility in a collaborative setting?
[Dragan et al., 2015]) and also effect the preference measure
as discussed above (e.g. a surveillance scenario makes certain
behaviors in the completions set more important to recognize,
and hence to obfuscate, than others).
Unified Approach to Interpretable Behavior
As we mentioned before, existing work has only looked at the
different notions of interpretable behavior in isolation. De-
signing these behaviors is likely to become more challenging
as we consider the effects of one or more of these behaviors
simultaneously. For example, what would it mean to be expli-
cable or predictable when there is ambiguity over the agent’s
goals? A legible plan given a goal might be an explicable plan
for another goal. From our previous discussion regarding the
fact that any of these behaviors can exist with or without the
other, it will be interesting to see how they can exist simulta-
neously. Further, given that some of these behaviors are pred-
icated on the notion of rationality on the agent model only
(explicability) and others are not (legibility and predictabil-
ity), it is unclear how the observer may be modeled once the
belief of rationality has been suspended (for example, due to
inexplicable but legible behavior).
Behaviors versus Plans
Though we alluded to this distinction very briefly at the start
of the paper, our discussion has mostly been confined to anal-
ysis of behaviors – i.e. one particular observed instantiation
of a plan or policy. In particular, a plan – which can be seen
as a set of constraints on behavior – engenders a candidate
set of behaviors [Kambhampati et al., 1996] some of which
may have certain interpretable properties while others may
not. However, this also means that an algorithm that can cap-
ture the “X”-ability of a plan can also do so for a particu-
lar behavior it models since in the worst case a behavior is
also a plan that has a singular candidate completion. A gen-
eral treatment of a plan can be very useful in the offline set-
ting – e.g. in decision-support [Sengupta et al., 2017] where
human decision-makers are deliberating over possible plans
with the support from an automated planner. Unfortunately,
interpretability of such plans has received very little attention
beyond explanation generation [Smith, 2012; Fox et al., 2017;
Borgo et al., 2018].
Conclusion
In conclusion, we looked at a variety of interpretable be-
haviors of an agent which provides a rich set of directives
to consider while designing agents that can account for the
observer model in their decision making processes. We also
saw how the ability to model and anticipate interpretabil-
ity of its own behavior can be dual-use – i.e. the agent
can use this to either reveal or obfuscate its intentions to
the observer. We compared and contrasted existing litera-
ture that has tackled various aspects of this problem and pro-
vided a unified framework for precise specification of these
(often confused) ideas. We also highlighted gaps in exist-
ing work and directions for future research. Finally, in this
survey we have focused on the interpretability of behavior
only, and the role of privacy and obfuscation in that context
only. There is a rich body of work in the planning commu-
nity that has explored these concepts in the context of in-
formation sharing in multi-agent planning [Brafman, 2015;
Sˇtolba, 2017] that can provide additional insights towards a
more general of formulation of privacy preservation and ob-
fuscation in a joint planning scenario.
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